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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Anthony Michael Matney appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing
his post-conviction petition.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2014, Matney was arrested for driving the under influence. (See R., pp.143144.) Because Matney had another felony DUI conviction within the previous 15 years, the state
charged him with felony DUI, I.C. § 18-8005(9). (See id.) In November 2014, Matney, while
represented by counsel, pled guilty to the charge. (R., pp.88-94.) Pursuant to an agreement with
the state, Matney also pled guilty to a persistent violator sentencing enhancement that the state
filed the same day as the change of plea hearing. (Id.)
After the change of plea hearing, but before sentencing, Matney sent a pro se letter to the
district court. (9/19/18 Augmentation, p.1. 1) In the letter, Matney asserted that on November 6,
2014, prior to his arraignment, his trial counsel told him that if he pled guilty to felony DUI, the
state would not file a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.

(Id.)

Matney did not

specifically assert that by the time he entered his guilty pleas, he was unaware that he was
pleading guilty to the sentencing enhancement. (See id.) Matney instead acknowledged that his
counsel “explain[ed] things” to him on November 26, 2015, the date of the change of plea
hearing. (Id.) Matney then requested either that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, or
that the state dismiss the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (Id.)
1

On September 19, 2018, this Court granted Matney’s motion to augment the appellate record
with Matney’s January 29, 2015 pro se letter to the district court. (9/19/18 Order.) The district
court took judicial notice of the letter in the underlying post-conviction proceeding. (R., p.156
n.2.)
1

At a continued sentencing hearing on February 4, 2015, the district court brought up the
matter of Matney’s pro se letter. (R., p.76.) The court took a recess so that Matney could consult
with his counsel. (Id.) After the recess, Matney’s counsel informed the court that Matney
wished to proceed to sentencing and to withdraw his request that his guilty pleas be withdrawn.
(Id.) After questioning from the court, Matney confirmed that this this was his desired course of
action. (R., pp.76-77.) The sentencing hearing then continued. (R., pp.77-81.)
The district court imposed a unified 25-year sentence with six and one-half years fixed.
(R., pp.47-48, 79-80.) The court denied Matney’s subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of
sentence. (R., pp.52-53, 56-71.) On direct appeal, Matney challenged only the district court’s
sentencing determination and denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion. See State v. Matney, Docket No.
44143, 2016 WL 106174 (Idaho App. January 8, 2016) (unpublished).

In an unpublished

opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Id.
In December 2016, Matney filed a pro se post-conviction petition. (R., pp.2-10.) The
petition contained two broad claims which collectively consisted of approximately 18 distinct
sub-claims. (R., pp.3-9.) The district court appointed counsel to represent Matney in the
proceeding. (R., pp.23-27.) However, appointed counsel declined to amend the petition. (R.,
pp.116-117.)
In his pro se petition, relevant to this appeal, Matney asserted (Claim 9(k)), that his trial
counsel gave him erroneous legal information regarding a defendant’s ability to withdraw his
guilty plea.

(R., p.8.)

Specifically, Matney asserted that during his continued sentencing

hearing, his trial counsel told him that “it was too late to withdraw his [p]leas,” and that
“withdrawal of a ‘[g]uilty’ [p]lea is absolutely not allowed.” (Id.) Matney further asserted that
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“[i]n retrospect, it is obvious that [trial counsel] lied to Matney to keep his secret unwritten
‘agreement’ with the prosecutor….” (Id.)
The state moved for the summary dismissal of Matney’s post-conviction petition. (R.,
pp.118-127.) The state noted its difficulty in attempting to construe Matney’s claims. (R., p.119;
p.119 n.1.) The state then argued that Matney’s factual assertions were conclusory and did not
establish a prima facie case as to any of his claims. (R., pp.123-124.) The state also noted that
the change of plea hearing transcript revealed that Matney understood the terms of the plea
agreement and the nature of his guilty pleas, including that he was pleading guilty to the
sentencing enhancement. (R., p.125.) Specifically with respect to Claim 9(k), the state noted
that the sentencing hearing transcript demonstrated that Matney wished to withdraw any request
he made to withdraw his guilty pleas after questioning from the court.

(R., pp.125-126.)

Therefore, the state asserted, Matney failed to allege facts demonstrating he was prejudiced by
any deficient trial counsel performance. (R., pp.125-126.) In response, Matney did not present
any additional evidence or attempt to clarify Claim 9(k). (See R., p.133.)
After a hearing (see generally Tr.), the district court granted the state’s motion for
summary dismissal (pp.143-159). The court first concluded that, as Matney acknowledged in his
response brief, many of Matney’s post-conviction claims did not meet the pleading requirements
of I.R.C.P. 11 and would be dismissed on that basis. (R., pp.147-148.) The court concluded that
other claims were forfeited because they could have been raised on direct appeal. (R., pp.149150.) With respect to Claim 9(k) (and several related claims), the court concluded: (1) Matney’s
guilty pleas were voluntarily and knowingly entered; and (2) Matney’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea likely would not have been successful even had it not been withdrawn. (R., pp.150157.)

Therefore, the court further concluded, even if trial counsel provided Matney with
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erroneous legal information about a defendant’s ability to withdraw his guilty pleas, Matney did
not demonstrate prejudice from this deficiency. (Id.)
166.)

4

Matney timely appealed. (R., pp.163-

ISSUE
Matney states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Matney’s Claim
9(k), where the basis for dismissal was that Mr. Matney had failed to prove his
claim?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Matney failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily dismissing
his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for providing him with an
incorrect legal standard regarding the withdrawal of guilty pleas?

5

ARGUMENT
Matney Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing His
Post-Conviction Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Providing Him With An Incorrect
Legal Standard Regarding The Withdrawal Of Guilty Pleas
A.

Introduction
Matney contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his post-conviction

petition. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-14.) Specifically, Matney assigns error to the court’s summary
dismissal of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him that it was “too late”
to withdraw his guilty pleas and that a withdrawal of a guilty plea is “absolutely not allowed.”
(Id.) Matney’s assertion fails. A review of the record reveals that Matney failed to allege facts
demonstrating that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance. The district court
therefore did not err in summarily dismissing this claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.” Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).

C.

Matney Failed To Allege Facts Demonstrating Strickland Prejudice With Respect To
Claim 9(k)
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure

Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent
civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to
relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662
P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
6

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the applicant
“has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims
upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d
738, 739 (1998).

Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction

application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true.
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not
required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110,
112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). Further,
allegations contained in a post-conviction petition are insufficient for granting relief when they
are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceeding or do not justify relief as a matter
of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903,
174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare
assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for
ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. An attorney’s
performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish
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prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241,
245 (Ct. App. 1999).
The state first acknowledges that in Claim 9(k), at least one of Matney’s factual
allegations established a prima facie case that his trial counsel provided deficient performance.
The alleged statement attributed to trial counsel that guilty plea withdrawals are “absolutely not
allowed” was (if the statement was made), plainly an objective misstatement of the law. See
I.C.R. 33(c). 2
However, as the district court also concluded (R., pp.154-157), Claim 9(k) was factually
inadequate to establish a prima facie Strickland prejudice claim. First, Matney did not attempt to
argue that a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas would have been successful, and a review of the
sentencing hearing transcript belies the relevant assertions from Matney’s pro se letter/motion to
the court which would have supported such a motion. Second, Matney did not specifically allege
that trial counsel’s misstatement of the relevant law was the reason he chose to withdraw his
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and a review of the change of plea hearing transcript cast
doubt on this nexus which Matney seeks to infer on appeal.
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is imposed. I.C.R.
33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right, however. State v.
Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535,
2

However, as the district court indicated (R., p.156), the alleged statement attributed to trial
counsel that “it was too late” for Matney to withdraw his guilty plea appeared to simply be a
statement of trial counsel’s opinion regarding the likelihood of such a withdrawal motion
actually being successful. The district court did not expressly analyze or make a Strickland
determination regarding trial counsel’s alleged statement that guilty plea withdrawals are
“absolutely not allowed.”
8

211 P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of proving, in the district
court, that the plea should be withdrawn. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; Griffith
v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 374-375, 825 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992). In ruling on a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea
was entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at
781; State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990). As a matter
of constitutional due process, a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is “entered by one fully aware
of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the
court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court must determine
whether other just cause exists to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. Hanslovan, 147
Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781. The good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s
assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide.
Id. at 537, 211 P.3d at 782. Further, when the motion to withdraw a guilty plea is presented after
the defendant has learned of the content of the PSI or has received other information about the
probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant’s
apparent motive. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004).
In this case, as the court noted, Matney’s PSI was compiled and disclosed to him prior to
the mailing of his pro se letter seeking a withdrawal of his guilty plea. (R., p.156.) Therefore,
the district court would have been permitted to “temper its liberality” in weighing Matney’s
apparent motive for wishing to withdraw his plea, had Matney decided to pursue such a motion.
This is particularly true considering the conclusions, observations and recommendation of the
PSI investigator. Matney’s PSI compiled his extensive criminal history and noted that several of
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his prior DUI offenses occurred while he was on probation or parole for previous convictions.
(#43056 PSI, pp.5-20, 31-32. 3)

The PSI investigator concluded that “although [Matney]

expressed a desire to seek treatment and remain in the community, based on his continued
alcohol abuse and criminal behavior, it is apparent he is not a suitable candidate for community
supervision at this juncture,” and that Matney “has no regard for the safety of others and is
extremely lucky he has not injured anyone with his dangerous behavior.” (#43056 PSI, p.32.)
The timing of Matney’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, made only after the PSI was
compiled, would have made it less likely that any such motion would have been successful.
In addition, the only ground Matney set forth for the withdrawal of his guilty pleas in his
pro se letter to the court is belied by the record. In the letter/motion, Matney alleged that on
November 6, 2014, prior to his arraignment, his trial counsel told him that if he pled guilty to
felony DUI, the state would not file a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (9/19/18
Augmentation, p.1.) It is not clear whether this alleged statement of trial counsel was intended to
relay an actual plea offer from the state, or was simply a prediction from trial counsel on how the
case may ultimately be resolved. Matney further did not specifically assert in the letter that by
the time he entered his guilty pleas, he was unaware that he was pleading guilty to the sentencing
enhancement. (See id.)
However, even if such factual assertions could be liberally inferred from Matney’s postconviction petition, a review of the change of plea hearing transcript reveals that Matney was
aware of the nature of his guilty pleas at the time they were entered. At the change of plea
hearing, the parties informed the state that Matney had agreed to plead guilty to the persistent

3

Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
the PSI associated with Matney’s underlying felony DUI conviction. The district court took
judicial notice of this PSI in Matney’s post-conviction proceeding. (R., p.156 n.2.)
10

violator sentencing enhancement. (R., p.88.) The court specifically informed Matney that the
maximum penalty for felony DUI, as enhanced due to Matney’s status as a persistent violator,
was life in prison. (Id.) Matney told the court that he understood he was pleading guilty to this
enhancement.

(Id.) After the court then specifically referenced the prior convictions that

supported it, Matney pled guilty to enhancement. (R., pp.88-89.) Finally, the court accepted
Matney’s guilty pleas after a lengthy colloquy to ensure that the pleas were knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. (R., pp.89-94.) Therefore, Matney’s request to withdraw his guilty plea, which
was based upon an implied assertion that he was unaware that he pled guilty to the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement, was clearly belied by the record.

The motion would

consequently have been unsuccessful had Matney decided to pursue it.
Additionally, Matney failed to allege a nexus between the erroneous legal information
allegedly provided by trial counsel and his own decision to withdraw the motion. A review of
the sentencing hearing transcript reveals that Matney personally decided to withdraw his motion
even after the district court indicated that he could choose to instead pursue it. After Matney
informed the court that he wished to withdraw his request to withdraw his plea, the court asked
Matney if he understood that it had the authority to impose up to a life sentence pursuant to the
persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., p.76.) Matney responded that he did. (Id.)
After noting that the “Part III” in the plea advisory signed by Matney referred to the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement (R., p.77), the following colloquy occurred:
Court:

But what I want to know -- I mean, if you -- you have to be
satisfied with this. I don’t know -- and I -- and you need to
understand that withdrawal of a guilty plea is not something that’s
automatic.

Matney:

I understand.
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Court:

If the judge has taken the plea and has gone through that, then that
isn’t something that just -- just because somebody changes their
mind, that happens. There have to be grounds.
And -- but you need to understand that if -- if you’re not satisfied
with the record, if you have further questions, my -- my objective
here is to make sure that you understand and that you know that
when you go forward, you’re subjected to up to life in the
penitentiary.
If you need further clarification and explanation, you can have
time to do that.

Matney:

No. Let’s just go ahead and proceed, Your Honor. I don’t want to
--

Court:

Okay. I just want to make sure you understand. Because when
somebody starts complaining later -- and it’s really typical is that if
they aren’t satisfied they understand everything, you know, you
can’t complain about it later.

Matney:

You made better light of it now that I got to see it. So -- you made
a lot better light about it because I have not gotten a copy of [the
plea advisory form].

(R., p.77.)
After the court again noted that the reference to “Part III” and “five to life” on the plea
advisory form referred to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement, and after Matney
asserted that he did not remember this information being contained on the form when he signed
it, the colloquy continued:
Court:

Yeah. And -- and the other thing, Mr. Matney, is I know you want
to get it over with. But if you -- honestly, if you -- this is serious.

Matney:

I understand, Your Honor.

Court:

And with your history, it’s very serious.
potentially a substantial sentence.

You’re looking at

And if you need to have that time to listen and to make sure that
you understand and have the attorneys go over with you what the
criteria is, whether or not you even would have a chance to get it
12

withdrawn, and if you got it withdrawn, what the State would have
to prove, which would be the -- the -- if you’re talking about the
Part II, which is, I think, the only thing that’s been talked -- there
isn’t any confusion about, that -- what they’d have to prove in
terms of prior judgments.
Matney:

I’m ready to go forward, Your Honor.

Court:

Okay.

Matney:

I just -- I -- [trial counsel] just told me that. When Judge Goff had
read through it and stuff, I was kind of emotional and stuff, and I
didn’t understand what was going on. And with him just bringing
it to light, so I do understand.

Court:

Okay.

Matney:

Go forward.

(Id.)
The court thus repeatedly gave Matney the opportunity to recant his request to withdraw
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, or to take more time to consider whether to do so. The
court also indicated to Matney that while withdrawal of his guilty pleas was not automatic, such
a course could theoretically be available to him should he be able to demonstrate adequate
grounds for withdrawal. Despite this questioning, Matney persistently maintained his chosen
course of action to withdraw his request and proceed to sentencing. Because Matney failed to
specifically allege a nexus between his trial counsel’s alleged misstatement of the law and his
own decision, even after thorough questioning from the court, to withdraw his request to
withdraw his guilty pleas, he has failed to allege facts establishing Strickland prejudice with
respect to this claim. In other words, Matney failed to allege facts demonstrating that he would
have gone forward with his motion to withdraw if not for receiving the erroneous legal
information from his trial counsel, even in light of the information and opportunity provided by
the district court to pursue the motion.
13

Finally, on appeal, Matney contends that the district court utilized incorrect standards in
summarily dismissing Claim 9(k). (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-14.) Specifically, Matney notes that
rather than express its conclusions in the proper framework of whether Matney failed to allege
facts establishing a prima facie claim, the district court concluded that Matney failed to
“establish[] either prong of the Strickland standard.” (Appellant’s brief, p.13 (citing R., p.156)
(emphasis in Appellant’s brief).) Matney also notes that the court concluded that Matney’s
motion to withdraw his pleas “most likely” would have been denied, when Matney only needed
to allege facts demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent trial
counsel’s deficient performance in order to make a prima facie showing of Strickland prejudice
in the summary dismissal stage of the proceeding. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14 (citing R.,
p.157).)
While the district court thus did not precisely reiterate the relevant legal standards when
formulating some of its conclusions, its language was broad enough not to cast doubt on the
underlying analysis which led to those conclusions. In its order summarily dismissing Matney’s
petition, the district court set forth the proper standards for both summary dismissal of postconviction petitions (R., pp.145-146), and ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims pursuant
to Strickland (R., pp.150-151).

There is nothing about its conclusions, aside from the

occasionally imprecise language in its summary statements as noted by Matney, indicating that
the district court disregarded these standards that it accurately identified. In any event, this Court
must analyze Matney’s claim and the district court’s findings and analysis utilizing the
appropriate legal standards as accurately set forth both by the district court in its summary
dismissal order, and by the state in motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.121-123); see also
Section B, supra (Standard of Review). An appellate court may affirm a district court order on

14

any correct legal theory. See, e.g., State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222
(1997); State v. Diaz, 158 Idaho 629, 636, 349 P.3d 1220, 1227 (Ct. App. 2015).
Matney has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for giving him erroneous legal information regarding
the possibility of withdrawing his guilty plea. This Court should therefore affirm the district
court’s summary dismissal of Matney’s post-conviction petition.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily
dismissing Matney’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 6th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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